Shakespeare and Selfhood by Curran, Kevin
Shakespeare never wrote a treatise on selfhood, but if he had, I think it might sound
something like this:
Hath not a Jew eyes? Hath not a Jew hands, organs, dimensions, senses,
affections, passions; fed with the same food, hurt with the same weapons, subject
to the same diseases, heal’d by the same means, warm’d and cool’d by the same
winter and summer, as a Christian is? If you prick us, do we not bleed? If you
tickle us, do we not laugh? If you poison us, do we not die? And if you wrong us,
shall we not revenge?
(3.1.59–67)1
What makes Shylock’s speech so arresting is the way it achieves depth through surface.
On one hand, the speech is an affirmation of legal personhood issued through an appeal
to basic equality and reciprocal rights. On the other, it’s an act of moral agency that
manifests Shylock as a self worthy of empathy. Importantly, though, Shylock’s selfhood
is rooted exclusively in outer life: hands, senses, food, germs, temperature, tickling,
violence, social practices. It’s not something unique about Shylock’s mental or spiritual
core that endows him with the complexity and emotional range prerequisite to selfhood.
Rather, it’s his invocation of a common stratum of creaturely life in which he partakes:
his physical and formal presence, his vegetative need for sustenance, his sensory
responses to outer stimuli. Shylock creates for playgoers a theater of recognition
grounded in the physical: acknowledge my eyes, my hands, my form, all the manifes-
tations of my creatureliness. It’s a singular moment of appearing and we know, unmis-
takably, that we’re supposed to care.2
In what follows, I will show how Shylock’s speech is emblematic of what we might
think of as ‘Shakespearean selfhood’ more generally. Rather than being a fixed and
bounded entity, the self in Shakespeare’s plays and poems emerges from a vital and
interdependent world of things. It’s a dynamic process involving an assortment of





philosopher A.N. Whitehead would have called Shakespearean selfhood an ‘actual
entity’. He used the term to describe the way seemingly discreet people and things are
in fact in states of constant interaction and change. Whitehead explains, ‘An actual
entity is a process, and is not describable in terms of the morphology of a stuff’.4 This
idea of dynamic process – of a gathering of different, relationally evolving agents – is
important because whether it takes the form of social (human-human) or material
(human-environment) relationality, it entails a way of thinking about non-individual
selfhood that is distinct from the more rigidly object-oriented materialism that emerged
in Renaissance studies in the 1990s. Work by scholars such as Patricia Fumerton,
Margreta de Grazia, Ann Rosalind Jones, and Peter Stallybrass, as well as slightly later
studies by Natasha Korda and Julian Yates, critiqued the Burckhardtian commitment
to interiority and emergent individualism that characterized the field. Instead, they
argued that selfhood inheres entirely in things, ‘in bric-a-brac worlds of decorations,
gifts, foodstuffs, small entertainments, and other particles of cultural wealth and show’,
to borrow Fumerton’s words.5 For these object-oriented materialists, selfhood is,
contra Whitehead, precisely ‘describable in terms of the morphology of a stuff’. I think
that Shakespeare shows us a different way out of individualism, one that includes
objects but which ultimately embraces a much broader and more eclectic world of
relational life.
In this, Shakespeare’s writing shares something with the rich body of materialist
philosophy that has in various ways tried to describe the embedded and transactional
aspects of human being. The political theorist Jane Bennett, for example, has argued that
acknowledging ‘interconnectedness’ is necessary if we want to change public policy on
issues like the environment, farming, and stem-cell research. The goal, according to her,
is to recognize ‘a political ecology of things’ existing on a horizontal, rather than a vertical
and hierarchical, plane.6 Bennett’s project, as she points out, draws on an established
philosophical history of vibrant matter that includes the writings of Spinoza, Nietzsche,
Thoreau, Darwin, Adorno, Bergson, Whitehead, and Deleuze. However, in thinking
about the way vibrant matter forms an ecology of association and exchange, she is
responding even more specifically to John Dewey, who was interested in the ‘dependence
of the self for wholeness upon its surrounding’, and Bruno Latour, who pushed Dewey’s
ideas in a more assuredly materialist direction.7 Bennett’s notion of ‘political ecologies’
might even be seen as a synthesis of Dewey’s idea of ‘conjoint action’ – the distributive,
cooperative agency necessary to generate a public sphere – and Latour’s rejection of the
exclusive categories of ‘nature’ and ‘culture’ in favour of the ‘collective’. As Latour
explains in Pandora’s Hope, ‘Humans, for millions of years, have extended their social
relations to other actants with which, with whom, they have swapped many properties,
and with which, with whom, they form collectives’.8 These collectives, or ecologies, are
not simply the contexts in which a person exists. They need to be understood as a model
for existence as such. ‘Who can say’, asks Henri Bergson in Creative Evolution, another
important contribution to this strand of thought,
where individuality begins and ends, whether the living being is one or many,
whether it is the cells which associate themselves into the organism or the
organism which disassociates itself into cells? In vain we force the living into
this or that one of our molds. All the molds crack. They are too narrow, above
all too rigid, for what we try to put into them.9
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Where does individuality begin and where does it end? Is the living being one or many?
These are questions that Shakespeare poses, too, and he does so through the uniquely
speculative languages of theatre and poetry. Bottom’s hybridity and Caliban’s creature-
liness ask us to reflect on the physical limits of the human; Othello’s handkerchief and
Macbeth’s dagger stage the materiality of thinking. Selfhood for Shakespeare is an open,
inclusive, and heterogeneous system, one marked by a variety of exchanges between body
and environment, human and non-human.
Of course, the philosophical context I have been sketching out so far consists entirely
of modern philosophers. What about the intellectual culture of Shakespeare’s own time?
Depending on the perspective you take, Shakespearean selfhood can be seen as either
moving with or working against the intellectual currents of the Renaissance. This is
because there was no single, uniformly accepted way of understanding the self in the
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Sweeping histories of selfhood from antiquity to
modernity by scholars like Charles Taylor, Timothy J. Reiss, and Jerrold Seigel offer
linear narratives that trace how one version of selfhood gradually evolved, or was cat-
aclysmically transformed, into another, with the Renaissance and Enlightenment periods
generally identified as key rupture points when communal forms of identity gave way to
increasingly rational, interiorized, and individual ideas of selfhood.10 But this is only
partially accurate. On one hand, the notion that people possessed unique inner lives was
widely available in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, as studies by Katharine
Eisaman Maus and Elizabeth Hanson have shown.11 Rene Descartes provides the
exemplary philosophical expression of this idea. In Part 4 of Discourse on the Method
(1637), Descartes famously writes, ‘I think, therefore I am’, describing ‘this truth’ as ‘the
first principle of the philosophy I was seeking’. He continues:
Then, examining with attention what I was, and seeing that I could pretend I
had no body and that there was no world nor any place where I was, I could not
pretend, on that account, that I did not exist at all, and that, on the contrary,
from the fact that I thought of doubting the truth of other things, it followed
very evidently and very certainly that I existed; whereas, on the other hand, had
I simply stopped thinking, even if all the rest of what I had imagined had been
true, I would have had no reason to believe that I had existed. From this I knew
that I was a substance the whole essence or nature of which is simply to think,
and which, in order to exist, has no need of any place nor depends on material
things. Thus this ‘I’, that is to say, the soul through which I am what I am, is
entirely distinct from the body and is even easier to know than the body, and
even if there were no body at all, it would not cease to be all that it is.12
This is the opposite of distributed selfhood. For Descartes, the self ‘has no need of any
place nor depends on material things’. Dislocated and disembodied, this is an ‘I’ that
exists in entirely self-referential terms. A vast and unbridgeable epistemological chasm
yawns between the Cartesian ‘I’ and the ultimately unknowable outer world of people
and things. Milton’s Lucifer said memorably, ‘The mind is its own place’ (1.254).13
For Descartes, the self is its own place.
Perhaps because of the power and precision of his theory, Descartes is routinely either
blamed for or credited with the next three to four hundred years of individualism and
scientific scepticism. Yet for all its influence, Descartes’s philosophy can hardly be taken
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as emblematic of Renaissance notions of the self. Richard Strier has even argued that the
hermetic model of selfhood, based entirely on inner life and available in other forms in
writings by Augustine, Martin Luther, and Montaigne, was exceptional rather than
dominant.14 It was at any rate only part of the total picture. Humoral theory, for
example, described both physical and mental experience as dictated by the balance of
four substances, or ‘humors’, common to all people. These are black bile, linked to the
qualities of dry and cold and prominent in those with a melancholic temperament;
phlegm, linked to the qualities of wet and cold and prominent in those with a phlegmatic
temperament; blood, linked to the qualities of hot and wet and prominent in those with a
sanguine temperament; and yellow bile, linked to the qualities of dry and hot and
prominent in those with a choleric temperament. Keeping the humors in balance
depended on how one managed six external factors known as the ‘non-naturals’: air, food
and drink, exertion and rest, sleeping and waking, retentions and evacuations, and
emotions (or ‘passions’).15 Humoral theory was systematized by the Roman physician
Galen and became deeply entrenched in both high and vernacular intellectual cultures
in Renaissance Europe. One study estimates that between 1500 and 1700 there were
approximately 590 different editions of the works of Galen published.16 In stark contrast
to Descartes, humoral theory is remarkable for the way it relates the body to the mind,
and both to the environment. The inner world of emotions and thought, what we would
call psychological states, are understood in material terms, as substances or fluids, in
humoral theory.17 And the dependence of those humors on external elements like food
and drink, and activities like eating, excreting, and sweating, which cross the boundary
between inner and outer, knit the self into a physical scene that extends beyond the
threshold of the body and certainly beyond the threshold of the mind.18 This is a form of
selfhood that does ‘have need of : : : place’ and certainly ‘depends on material things’.
Humoral theory was just one of the languages available for thinking about selfhood in
non-proprietary terms. The Dutch philosopher Baruch Spinoza, for instance, argued
vigorously that the world, its inhabitants, and even the thoughts generated by those
inhabitants were formed of a single substance. This idea is the foundation of his seminal
work, The Ethics (1677), and he devotes the first fifteen propositions of Part I to proving
it. Spinoza positioned himself against Descartes and the medieval-Platonic tradition
from which Descartes’s dualism derived. The notion that one could separate the body
from the mind, one person from another, humans from animals, and anything from the
larger natural environment was, as far as Spinoza was concerned, a metaphysical illusion.
Thoughts, bodies, people, animals, plants, and rocks were, according to him, merely
different modes of the same infinitely variable substance. He writes, ‘We are a part of
Nature which cannot be conceived independently of other parts’. This means, in the first
place, that we are not autonomous. Instead, our actions, thoughts, and emotions need to
be understood as the result of a collaborative form of agency that involves multiple
minds, multiple bodies, and the whole of the material environment. ‘The force whereby a
man persists in existing’, Spinoza writes, ‘is limited, and infinitely surpassed by the power
of external causes’.19 Selfhood in this account is a finite mode of a larger vital ecology.
Spinoza formulated this argument at a level of detail and with a degree of moral rigour
that made The Ethics unique. But his basic ideas about the relationship between indi-
vidual selves and the larger material world were not entirely new. Diverse examples of
distributed selfhood could be found in Renaissance literature, for example. A poem like
Henry Vaughan’s ‘The Morning Watch’, which opens, ‘O joys! Infinite sweetness! with
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what flowers,/And shoots of glory, my soul breaks, and/buds’ (1–3), articulates a vitalism
that is at once violent and exhilarating. The poet-speaker’s soul, that immaterial entity
‘through which’, in Descartes’s Discourse, ‘I am what I am’, is here shot through with
roots and flowers and gloriously disfigured by buds. There is no hierarchy of substance in
these lines and no privileged inner world; everything is democratically enmeshed in what
Vaughan describes later in the poem as ‘the quick world’ (10).20 Another alternative to
hermetic selfhood is found in the conventional Renaissance trope of two bodies –
typically the bodies of two lovers – sharing one soul. I quote here from John Donne’s
‘The Ecstasy’:
But as these several souls contain
Mixture of things, they know not what,
Love, these mixed souls doth mix again,
And makes both one, each this and that.
(33–6)21
These lines are interesting because they describe how love makes the souls of the man
and woman ‘one’ while also presenting the more challenging idea that each soul remains
itself at the same time as it becomes something entirely distinct from itself (i.e. another
soul): ‘Each’ is ‘this and that’. There is a kind of monism at work here, but one that
preserves, even highlights, the paradox of being both one thing and another thing. This
is a kind of playfulness that programmatic philosophy like Spinoza’s Ethics cannot afford
to indulge in, but which poetry certainly can. The verb Donne coins slightly later in the
poem, ‘interanimates’, indicates more precisely the way the lovers’ merged souls are to be
imagined as forming a co-dependent life-world rather than simply a single substance.22
The trope of the merged souls, or merged selves, is one that Shakespeare is particularly
fond of. In The Comedy of Errors, for example, Adriana says to Antipholus of Syracuse,
O, how comes it,
That thou art then estranged from thyself?
Thyself I call it, being strange to me,
That, undividable incorporate,
Am better than thy dear self’s better part.
Ah, do not tear away thyself from me;
For know, my love, as easy mayst thou fall
A drop of water in the breaking gulf,
And take unmingled thence that drop again,
Without addition or diminishing,
As take from me thyself and not me too.
(2.2.119–29)
The idea that one can be estranged from oneself might sound rather mundane to us,
living as we do in a culture where people regularly profess not to be themselves, or insist
on the need to pull themselves together or spend more time with themselves. Yet
common as they may be, these expressions correlate to a way of thinking about self-
hood that is scattered, mobile, and permeable.23 So too does Adriana’s concern about
self-estrangement – the idea of somehow being apart from one’s self – and her sub-
sequent image of her metaphysical relationship to Antipholus of Syracuse as being like
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a drop of water in a ‘breaking gulf’. This is a distributed and pointedly non-individual
version of selfhood; ‘a kind of self resides with you’, as Cressida puts it in Troilus and
Cressida (3.2.148).
We find other versions of these ideas in Shakespeare’s sonnets, where selfhood is
frequently built from the outside in, rather than from the inside out. Hannah Arendt
describes how the Romans used the terms for being alive and being among men inter-
changeably, recalling for us a way of thinking about sentience as collective experience.24
A similar current of thought runs throughout the sonnets. Consider sonnet 138, which
reimagines truth – typically conceived of as absolute, transcendent, and singular – as
something made collaboratively in the world of action and decision. As long as there is
agreement among the parties involved, truth can be assembled from anything – even lies.
The opening lines declare:
When my love swears that she is made of truth,
I do believe her though I know she lies,
That she might think me some untutored youth,
Unlearned in the world’s false subtleties.
(1–4)25
Truth (the woman is faithful, the man is young) is not keyed to what the individual
knows, but instead to what the social unit actively chooses to believe. Collective par-
ticipation is the substance of truth and its necessary condition. Is there a cynical streak in
Shakespeare’s presentation of this idea? Perhaps. But there’s also optimism, even delight,
in the notion that truth can be a matter of social contract. Sonnet 138 invites us, briefly,
into a scene where the content of each individual’s claims – the question of whether they
are correct or not – is less important than the conditions of mutual recognition under
which those claims are made. Truth, the sonnet proposes, is not a thing in itself; it’s
an effect of shared discourse and common acknowledgment, a matter of form not of
substance.
Other thematizations of sociality can be found in sonnets 1–17, the ‘procreation
group’. This sequence advances multiple versions of the same basic argument: the young
man is too beautiful not to have children; if he does not produce ‘another self’ (10.13) to
preserve his beauty, he is committing a crime against ‘the world’ (1.13). The key to this
argument is the belief that beauty belongs not to the individual fortunate enough to
possess it, but rather to the larger public world that desires to experience it. Beauty is ‘the
world’s due’ (1.14), a common resource loaned by Nature to particular men and women
who then bear the responsibility of distributing and maintaining it: ‘Nature’s bequest
gives nothing, but doth lend,/And being frank she lends to those are free’ (4.3–4). The
young man’s failure to live up to his social responsibility is castigated in a variety of ways.
He is presented as ‘glutton[ous]’ (1.13), ‘Unthrifty’ (4.1), and ‘self-willed’ (6.13). Even
more sensationally, he is described as ‘possessed with murd’rous hate’ (10.5). The speaker
of sonnet 9 avers: ‘No love toward others in that bosom sits/That on himself such
murd’rous shame commits’ (13–14). Murder is the most profoundly anti-social behav-
iour. The logic of its inclusion in these sonnets has to do with two assumptions the
procreation group makes about selfhood: first, that a self is not reducible to a single
person, but is constituted instead by an inter-generational network of family members
who share the same core attributes. Second, and in a very similar spirit, that you do not
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belong to you. You belong to the commons, to society. So, when a beautiful person fails
to have children, they not only fail to complete themselves, they also deprive society of
what is rightfully theirs. It’s a form of self-murder and an affront to the community.
Sonnet 13 addresses these matters explicitly:
O that you were yourself; but, love, you are
No longer yours than you yourself here live.
Against this coming end you should prepare,
And your sweet semblance to some other give.
So should that beauty which you hold in lease
Find no determination; then you were
Yourself again after your self’s decease
(1–7)
The argument here is not simply: you will die someday, so have a child and triumph over
death. The idea, more precisely, is that living in a singular sense – living exclusively as
and for the self – is not really living at all. Life becomes meaningful, and ethical, when
conceived of in terms of others. This can be ‘the world’, whose demand for recognition is
heard so often in the procreation group, or it can be the inter-generational community of
parents and progeny. ‘You had a father’, sonnet 13 concludes, ‘let your son say so’ (14).
I want to offer one final example of distributed selfhood in Shakespeare, and in doing
so return to the theatre. In Macbeth, towards the end of Act 2.1, we find the title-
character alone on stage. His servant has gone to bed; so has Banquo. Left by himself to
ponder for a moment the crime he is about to commit, Macbeth stares intently into
empty space and says the following:
Is this a dagger which I see before me,
The handle toward my hand? Come, let me clutch
thee:
I have thee not, and yet I see thee still.
Art thou not, fatal vision, sensible
To feeling as to sight? or art thou but
A dagger of the mind, a false creation,
Proceeding from the heat-oppressed brain?
I see thee yet, in form as palpable
As this which now I draw.
(2.1.33–41)
There has been a tendency in criticism devoted to Macbeth to view this speech as a
moment during which some form of interiority is disclosed: ‘the growth of evil in the
mind’, ‘the divided soul’, or ‘the functioning of conscience’, to give a few examples.26
But this is only part of the picture. If we focus too narrowly on the idea of interiority we
risk obviating what, in my view, makes the speech unique and intellectually potent: its
complex marshalling of mind and matter. Rather than simply staging interiority, the
dagger scene treats the process of becoming criminal in a way that makes physical sen-
sation integral to mental conception. The initial question that Macbeth poses – ‘Is this a
dagger which I see before me,/The handle toward my hand?’ – has to do not only with
what at that moment Macbeth knows, but also, as we quickly discover, with how he
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knows it: through vision (‘see’) and through touch (‘Come, let me clutch thee’). These
lines describe knowledge and thought as part of a larger sensual experience that extends
beyond the mental or spiritual into a real, material world of things and actions. This is
not to say that Macbeth does not think himself into the criminal event, but rather that
the thinking he does he does at least in part with his body. Knowledge requires a physical
extension outward, which means the kernel of thought is not mental activity per se but
the objects and environments that generate that mental activity when perceived by the
senses. Thinking exceeds the boundaries of the purely physical or purely mental since
it entails an act of quasi-physical mental acquisition, one which in this soliloquy is
literalized when Macbeth reaches out for the mental dagger, eventually replacing it with
his own real dagger.
What we see in the dagger scene, then, is not so much criminal intent as it is something
we might call criminal intentionality. Criminal intent – the premeditation of a murder, for
example – refers to something mental. And though it also presupposes a will towards an
action in the objective world outside, it still designates the mental inception of that act
as chronologically prior to its materialized performance and, to that extent, as separate
from it. As Jonathan Gil Harris reminds us, chronological thinking is ‘a practice [that]
works to separate time into a linear series of units : : : each of which is partitioned from
what precedes and follows it’.27 Intentionality, on the other hand, is a phenomenological
concept that models mind-body relations in a rather different way. In Edmund Husserl’s
formulation, the doctrine of intentionality states that every act of consciousness, every
thought, is directed towards an object of some sort. That is to say, consciousness is always
consciousness of something: the thought and the thing are never readily separable.28
Indeed, the thing – what Husserl would call an ‘intentional object’, or noema29 – creates
the thought, creates the very conditions of sentience; not the other way around. In
Macbeth’s soliloquy, the dagger takes on the role of the intentional object. It catalyses
Macbeth’s consciousness of his own criminality and at the same time teeters playfully on
the frontier between idea and object. Treason is not anchored to a founding moment of
cogito in this scene. Instead, it should be viewed as evolving out of something Tim Bayne
calls ‘agentive experience’, a distributed and dynamic process involving both thinking
and feeling, imagination and action.30
So far, this essay has devoted itself to describing Shakepearean selfhood, both its
conceptual structure and its historical coordinates. The question that might remain for
some readers is why such an undertaking matters. Does an understanding of the self in
Shakespeare’s plays and poems get us any closer to a broader sense of why those works
matter? I think it does, and I’ll explain why by returning to the speech with which
I opened. At the end of that brief discussion, I noted that audiences experiencing
Shylock’s words know unmistakably that they’re supposed to care. Why is that? Why
do we tend to feel that a recognition of Shylock on the terms he’s established matter?
The reason, I think, is quite simple and it forms the basis of what I have described
elsewhere as Shakespeare’s ‘ethics of exteriority’. It matters because acts of collective
recognition are socially affirming; they ground us in an environment of shared experi-
ence and common imagination and establish, therefore, the only possible conditions
for responsible world-making.31
Shakespeare’s ethics of exteriority accrue from scenes of collective thought, inter-
personal experience, and material embeddedness of the sort discussed in this essay. They
come most fully into view when we start posing fundamental questions about distributed
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selfhood: what does it mean to imagine alternatives to interiority? What are the impli-
cations of looking outward instead of inward? Modern philosophers have offered their
own answers to these questions. For Emmanuel Levinas, for example, exteriority is a force
that pushes back against humanity’s deeply entrenched egotism. Disasters like the
Holocaust, he argued, were always, at their root, the result of a simple yet catastrophic
failure to recognize the other. Exteriority becomes a crucial concept for him precisely
because it describes a way of living that is keyed to the ethical demand of the not-you.32
Charles Taylor makes a similar point when he asserts that ‘a self only exists in : : : “webs
of interlocution”’.33 He writes:
I define who I am by defining where I speak from, in the family tree, in social
space, in the geography of social statuses and functions, in my intimate relations
to the ones I love, and also crucially in the space of moral and spiritual
orientation within which my most important defining relations are lived out.34
Building on Charles Taylor’s arguments, Paul Ricoeur points out that a disregard for
these ‘webs of interlocution’ has led to the deeply entrenched, liberal legal fiction of a
‘subject of law, constituted prior to any societal bond’. To recognize the role of otherness
in the formation of selfhood, he explains, is to strike at the root of this fiction and to
create the conditions whereby individuals ‘participate in the burdens related to per-
fecting the social bond’.35 Hannah Arendt addressed the idea of exteriority, too, though
she used a different term: ‘conditional existence’. In The Human Condition, she writes:
Whatever touches or enters into a sustained relationship with human life
immediately assumes the character of a condition of human existence. This is
why men, no matter what they do, are always conditioned beings. Whatever
enters the human world of its own accord or is drawn into it by human effort
becomes part of the human condition. The impact of the world’s reality upon
human existence is felt and received as a conditioning force. The objectivity of
the world – its object- or thing-character – and the human condition supplement
each other; because human existence is conditional existence, it would be
impossible without things, and things would be a heap of unrelated articles, a
non-world, if they were not the conditioners of human existence.36
Arendt’s notion of conditionality comes close to the idea of exteriority. Both terms
denote a way of understanding human existence as a product of the social and material
world out there, in all of its plurality. In Arendt’s view, this insight has important
implications for how we understand politics. In order for political action to be human,
which is to say humane, it must first be conceived as something contingent upon the
needs of other stakeholders. Like Levinas, Arendt felt that the alternative, an egotistical
view of politics centred on individual making, led eventually to totalitarian disasters like
Stalinism and Nazism. In The Human Condition, therefore, Arendt lays the philosophical
groundwork for a political practice based on collaboration, acknowledgement, and
responsibility. Shakespeare’s ethics of exteriority lack, as they should, the programmatic
specificity of philosophical argument, but the plays and sonnets I’ve explored in this essay
nevertheless diagram a situated, relational, and distributed form of selfhood that Levinas,
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James Kuzner, 2016. Shakespeare as a Way of Life: Skeptical Practice and the Politics of Weakness. New York:
Fordham University Press.
This book presents a Shakespeare who is skeptical of autonomy, revealing instead an ethics of sociality at
the centre of his work.
Michael Witmore, 2008. Shakespearean Metaphysics. London: Bloomsbury.
This book offers a short account of Shakespeare as a metaphysical thinker, alongside Spinoza, Bergson, and
Whitehead.
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